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Abstract
Population axiology is the study of the conditions under which one
state of affairs is better than another, when the states of affairs in ques-
tion may differ over the numbers and the identities of the persons who ever
live. Extant theories include totalism, averagism, variable value theories,
critical level theories, and “person-affecting” theories. Each of these the-
ories is open to objections that are at least prima facie serious. A series of
impossibility theorems shows that this is no coincidence: it can be proved,
for various sets of prima facie intuitively compelling desiderata, that no
axiology can simultaneously satisfy all the desiderata on the list. One’s
choice of population axiology appears to be a choice of which intuition
one is least unwilling to give up.
1 Population ethics and population axiology: The
basic questions
In many decision situations, at least in expectation, an agent’s decision has
no effect on the numbers and identities of persons born. For those situations,
fixed-population ethics is adequate. But in many other decision situations, this
condition does not hold. Should one have an additional child? How should
life-saving resources be prioritised between the young (who might go on to have
children) and the old (who are past reproductive age)? How much should one
do to prevent climate change from reducing the number of persons the Earth
is able to sustain in the future? Should one fund condom distribution in the
developing world? In all these cases, one’s actions can affect both who is born
and how many people are (ever) born. To deal with cases of this nature, we
need variable-population ethics: ‘population ethics’ for short.
In purely general terms, part of any plausible theory of ethics, fixed- or
variable-population, is its axiology: that is, its ordering of states of affairs in
terms of better and worse overall. Importantly, this applies also to plausible non-
consequentialist theories. Non-consequentialists may well admit side-constraints
(Nozick, 1974) and/or agent-centred prerogatives (Scheﬄer, 1982) to limit the
extent to which they counsel being guided by considerations of the good, but the
limitations cannot plausibly be so severe as to leave no room for considerations
of overall good.1 So also for the case of population ethics: part of any plausible
1For some dissent from this widely accepted view, see (Taurek, 1977) and (Foot, 1985).
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theory of population ethics is its population axiology. A population axiology is
a betterness ordering of states of affairs, where the states of affairs include ones
in which different numbers of persons are ever born.2
In addition to this concept of betterness-overall, we also have a concept of
one state of afairs being better or worse for a particular individual than another
state of affairs. A person’s well-being level in a given state of affairs relates to
this latter concept: it is an index of how good or bad that state of affairs is for
that person. It is usually assumed that the scale of possible well-being levels
has at least cardinal structure (that is, that ratios of well-being differences are
well-defined; as we will see below, some population axiologies also require there
to be additional structure beyond this).
Virtually all of the literature on population axiology represents states of
affairs via a specification of how many persons (and, if and where required:
which persons) exist, together with an assignment of lifetime well-being levels
to those persons. This is not to deny that values other than well-being – desert,
shared culture, and so on – might have an importance that is independent of
their contributions to well-being levels; it is only to assume that all such other
values can sensibly be held fixed, so that we can compare states of affairs on the
basis of the specified well-being profiles under the stipulation that there are no
relevant differences in the extent to which people get what they deserve (etc.)
in the states of affairs in question.
Fixed-population axiology underdetermines population axiology. To take the
simplest example: even if one has decided that an ordering of states of affairs in
terms of aggregate well-being (i.e. ‘utilitarianism’, in a restricted sense of that
term) is the correct axiology for fixed-population cases, this does not settle one’s
view on whether the betterness ordering in a variable-population context is given
by total well-being, average well-being, some kind of compromise between the
two (as in some of the ‘Variable Value theories’ discussed below), or anything
else that reduces to the total well-being ordering in fixed-population cases. (To
put this another way: a fixed-population axiology is a non-trivial equivalence
class of variable-population axiologies.) Population axiology therefore opens up
new questions. These new questions turn out to be surprisingly difficult.
The structure of this survey article is as follows. Sections 2–5 discuss various
concrete proposals for a population axiology: Totalist and Averagist theories,
‘Variable Value’ theories, ‘Critical Level’ theories, and various proposals based
in one way or another on ‘person-affecting’ ideology. In each case, we will see
that the proposed axiology is open to some serious objection. Section 6 explains
that this is no accident: here I outline ‘impossibility theorems’ that show that,
in the domain of population axiology (and unlike the fixed-population case),
any proposed axiology will violate one or more of a number of initially very
compelling intuitive constraints. I briefly discuss what the appropriate response
to this situation might be.
2Since population axiology is concerned with the numbers and identities of persons who are
ever born, not merely those who exist at some specified time, the ‘states of affairs’ in question
are ’timeless’ (i.e., they include covering the whole history of the universe from remote past
to remote future), rather than instantaneous.
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Throughout, I will assume that the correct axiology for the fixed-population
case is a utilitarian one (corresponding to summing or, equivalently in the fixed-
population case, averaging well-being across persons). This is of course contro-
versial: in particular, many authors defend instead a prioritarian or egalitarian
axiology for the fixed-population case (for discussion, see e.g. (Broome, 1991;
L. Temkin, 1993; Parfit, 1997)). The assumption, however, is made only for
simplicity: one could easily formulate prioritarian and/or egalitarian versions
of the population axiologies discussed below, and much of the discussion would
remain essentially unchanged.3
2 Totalism and Averagism
We start with the two most obvious population axiologies:
Totalism: A is better than B iff total well-being in A is higher than total well-
being in B. If A and B have equal total well-being, then A and B are
equally good.
Averagism: A is better than B iff average well-being in A is higher than av-
erage well-being in B. If A and B have equal average well-being, then A
and B are equally good.
While these two axiologies themselves are straightforward enough to be easily
understood from their verbal descriptions, it will be helpful, going forward, to
have a uniform more formal notation. To this end, for an arbitrary state of
affairs X, let |X| be the number of people in X, and let X be the average
well-being level in X. In this notation, Totalism and Averagism are represented
respectively by the value functions
VTot(X) = |X|X; (1)
VAv(X) = X. (2)
Note that Totalism is well-defined only relative to a choice of zero point on the
well-being scale; this zero point is generally taken to be the threshold at which
life becomes ‘worth living’.4
Each of these population axiologies is, on further reflection, open to serious
objection. The key objection to Totalism is that, at least if the well-being scale
has a structure like that of the real numbers and provided the set of possible
states of affairs is sufficiently rich, Totalism entails
3Non-utilitarian axiologies have been explored in the variable-population context by e.g.
(Brown, 2007; Holtug, 2007; Adler, 2009; Fleurbaey & Voorhoeve, 2016; Arrhenius, n.d.,
chapter 7).
4There is some subtlety about precisely how this notion of ‘life worth living’ is to be
understood, if it is not sufficiently intuitive to stand without definition. For discussion, see
(Broome, 2004, pp.66-8) and (Arrhenius, n.d., chapter 2).
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The Repugnant Conclusion: For any state of affairs A, there is a better
state of affairs Z in which no-one has a life that is more than barely worth
living.
Figure 1: The Repugnant Conclusion.
If Totalism is rejected on the basis of the Repugnant Conclusion, it might
be tempting to embrace Averagism. While Averagism avoids the Repugnant
Conclusion, however, it faces other problems that are at least as serious. For
example, since adding a large number of people with positive but below-average
well-being can reduce the average more than adding a smaller number of people
with negative well-being would, Averagism entails
The Sadistic Conclusion: A state of affairs resulting from adding persons
with negative well-being is sometimes better than one resulting from adding
persons with positive well-being, from the same starting point.
Figure 2: Averagism entails the Sadistic Conclusion: in the example illustrated,
A has lower average well-being than B.
In addition (and relatedly), Averagism violates
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The Mere Addition Principle: Let A be any state of affairs. Let B be a
state of affairs that is just like A except that, in addition, some extra
people with lives worth living exist in B who do not exist in A. Then B is
not worse than A.
In saying that B is ‘just like A’, we mean here that everyone who exists in A
also exists in B, and has the same well-being level in B as in A (see figure 3).
Figure 3: A ‘mere addition’. In the case depicted here, B has lower average
well-being than A.
Many are willing, on reflection, to reject the Mere Addition Principle. But
this is at least prima facie puzzling: how can B be not only not better than
A, but actually worse than A, if the change from A to B is only a matter of
adding some extra people whose lives are worth living (and who, therefore, are
if anything glad to be alive), and who are not hurting anyone?5
3 Variable Value views
In response to the problems faced by Totalism and Averagism, some theorists
have investigated axiologies according to which the value (positive or negative) of
adding an extra person with a fixed well-being level has a diminishing marginal
value, i.e. is of smaller magnitude when the number of pre-existing persons is
larger. Call these Variable Value theories.
In particular, Variable Value theories are sometimes designed to be compro-
mises between Totalism and Averagism. Arguably, Averagism is intuitively less
plausible for small populations: if there are otherwise only ten persons who will
ever live, for instance, it (perhaps) seems more worthwhile to add an additional
person with a given positive well-being level than if there are already 100 billion
persons. We might therefore seek a theory that approximates Totalism at small
population sizes, but approximates Averagism at large population sizes (and, in
particular, thereby avoids the Repugnant Conclusion): for example,
5For other objections to Averagism, see (T. M. Hurka, 1982a, 1982b; Parfit, 1984, section
143).
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Variable Value theory: The value of a state of affairs X is given by
VV V (X) = Xg(|X|), (3)
where g is a strictly increasing and strictly concave function with a horizontal
asymptote (T. Hurka, 1983; Y.-k. Ng, 1989).
This view (and its value function) requires some explanation. The qualitative
shape of the function g is as depicted in figure 4:
Figure 4: A ‘variable value’ transform, with horizontal asymptote g∗.
This view then agrees with Totalism that when population size is small, ‘mere
additions’ tend to amount to improvements. Indeed, for comparisons between
small populations, the Variable Value theory represented by (3) approximates
Totalism more generally: at sufficiently small population sizes, the function
g (|X|) is well approximated by a straight line through the origin (g (|X|) '
β|X|, for some positive constant β ∈ <+), and so (3) is approximately equal to
the Totalist value function (up to a uniform positive multiplicative constant).
However, thanks to the concave shape of the transform g, the same is not true
at large population sizes. When the population size becomes sufficiently large,
the curve g(|X|) instead approximates the horizontal dotted line (the curve’s
asymptote), and gets closer and closer to this line the larger the population size
becomes: thus, for the purpose of comparisons between states of affairs both
of whose timeless populations are large, this Variable Value theory roughly
approximates Averagism. In particular, average-reducing ‘mere additions’ tend
to count as disimprovements when the population is already very large.
This Variable Value theory does not entail the Repugnant Conclusion. This
is because according to (3), the value of a state of affairs in which no-one has
a well-being level higher than the ‘barely worth living’ level  — no matter
how large the population is — can never be more than the finite value g∗.
Therefore, provided the ‘A’ population is such that Ag (|A|) is greater than the
fixed number g ∗  — a condition that is easily met by states of affairs with high
average well-being levels — Z can never be better than A, no matter how large
the ‘Z’-population.
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The Variable Value theory represented by (3), however, both violates the
Mere Addition principle and entails the Sadistic Conclusion. This is unsurpris-
ing: that view was precisely designed (in part) to mimic Averagism at some
population sizes, and as we noted above, Averagism has both these properties.
One might suspect that any theory that mimics Totalism at small population
sizes, but employs the notion of ‘diminishing marginal value’ in such a way as to
avoid the Repugnant Conclusion, will violate the Mere Addition principle and
entail the Sadistic Conclusion. This would of course be true if any such theory
had to ‘mimic Averagism’ in every sense at large population sizes. But in fact
the suspicion turns out to be incorrect, as is shown by the following ‘Geometrist’
axiology (Sider, 1991):
Geometrism: The value of a state of affairs X is given by
VGeo(X) =
n∑
i=1
wi(X)
ri−1
+
m∑
j=1
wj(X)
rj−1
, (4)
where:
• the index i in the first summation ranges over persons whose well-being
level in X is positive, ordered from best off to worst off;
• the index j in the second sum ranges over persons whose well-being level
in X is negative, ordered from worst off to best off;
• r is a constant that is greater than 1.
Provided the constant r is chosen to be close to 1, this theory mimics Totalism
at small population sizes (because with r close to 1, if both n and m are small,
neither 1ri−1 with i < n nor
1
rj−1 with j < m can ever be much different from
1). However, Geometrism also deviates from Totalism at large populations,
encoding the idea of ‘diminishing marginal value’ in such a way as to avoid
the Repugnant Conclusion. According to Geometrism, the value of a state of
affairs in which everyone’s well-being level is  can never, no matter how large
the population, be greater than the sum
∑n
i=1

ri−1 ; but this sum, although it
contains an infinite number of terms, has the finite value  rr−1 .
The theoretical possibility of Geometrism illustrates that it is possible to
both satisfy the Mere Addition principle and avoid the Repugnant Conclusion,
but not that it is possible to do so in a desirable way. Indeed, this view (as
its creator was well aware6) is profoundly anti-egalitarian. This is easy to see
by considering the theory’s treatment of persons with positive well-being, even
in the fixed-population context. If Jim has well-being level 100 and Bob has
well-being level 20, then Jim’s well-being will be weighted more heavily than
Bob’s in the geometric sum (4) (recall that in that sum, persons with positive
well-being are ordered from best off to worst off, and that their well-being is then
6Sider outlines Geometrism not as a serious proposal for the correct population axiology,
but merely by means of counterexample to the claim that every variable value theory will
violate the Mere Addition principle.
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weighted by a factor 1ri−1 that is greater for persons whose well-being appears
earlier in the sum). It follows that removing some fixed amount of well-being
from the better-off Jim and transferring it to the worse-off Bob – for example,
transferring 40 units of well-being from Jim to Bob, so that they both end up at
60 — amounts to making things worse, according to this theory. Further, since
any such ‘equalising’ transfer will count as making things worse by some finite
amount, the result will still count as worse even after we subsequently increase
the well-being levels of all persons by a sufficiently small amount (if, perhaps,
Jim and Bob both end up at 65 rather than 60). That is, Geometrism violates
the following fixed-population-size condition:
Non-Anti-Egalitarianism: Let A, B be states of affairs such that the fol-
lowing three conditions all hold: A and B contain the same number of
individuals; all individuals in B have equal well-being; B has higher total
(and hence average) well-being than A. Then, B is better than A.
But violation of Non-Anti-Egalitarianism seems unacceptable. While some ax-
iologists (namely utilitarians) are willing to accept that equality of well-being
has no intrinsic value, so that inequality-increasing transfers of well-being are
matters of indifference, nobody normally thinks that such transfers are posi-
tively good (as they would have to be if they could sometimes offset or outweigh
decreases in total well-being).
4 Critical Level theories
The Critical Level family of population axiologies (Blackorby & Donaldson,
1984; Blackorby, Bossert, & Donaldson, 1995; Broome, 2004; Blackorby, Bossert,
& Donaldson, 2005) consists of variants on Totalism. Like Totalism (and unlike
Averagism and Variable Value theories), any Critical Level theory holds that
the ‘contributive value’7 of an extra person depends only on that additional
person’s well-being level, and not on either the number of pre-existing persons
nor those pre-existing persons’ well-being levels. But while Totalism holds that
an additional person’s contributive value is simply equal to her well-being level,
Critical Level theories hold that the contributive value of adding an extra person
is equal to that extra person’s well-being level minus some constant, α:
VCL(X) = |X|
(
X − α) . (5)
Defenders of Critical Level theories propose that the constant α should be
positive (α > 0). Heuristically, then, on this view, an additional person increases
the value of the world provided her well-being is above the ‘critical’ threshold α;
such an addition decreases the value of the world not only if the extra person’s
well-being level w is negative, but also if it lies in the range 0 ≤ w < α.
7That is: the amount by which the extra person’s existence increases the overall value
of the world, relative to a state of affairs in which she does not exist but all other persons’
well-being levels are equal.
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A consequence of this is that these Critical Level theories do not entail the
Repugnant Conclusion, at least as stated above: if  (the level of a life ‘barely
worth living’) is less than the critical level α, then an increasingly large ‘Z-
population’ of persons with well-being , on this view, has an overall value that
is increasingly negative, and certainly less than that of the A-population (which
has positive value according to (5) provided only that the average well-being
level in A is above the critical level).
Critical Level theories, however, nonetheless entail a variant of the Repug-
nant Conclusion: for any state of affairs A, no matter how good, there exists
some better state of affairs Z (involving a very large population) in which no-one
has a well-being level that is more than barely above the critical level. Call this
the ‘Weak Repugnant Conclusion’ (figure 5).
How bad this is of course depends on how high the critical level is. If the
critical level is sufficiently high that any life with a well-being above α is not just
‘barely worth living’, but fairly good, then it may not be at all counterintuitive
to hold that for any population A and any positive amount of well-being  > 0,
there is a sufficiently large population Z′ that is better than A and in which
no-one has a well-being level that is higher than α+ .
Figure 5: Critical Level theories entail the Weak Repugnant Conclusion.
However, this way of rendering the Weak Repugnant Conclusion intuitively
acceptable comes at a price. Note first that any Critical Level theory with a
positive critical level both violates the Mere Addition principle and entails the
Sadistic Conclusion (figure 6). Secondly, the way in which the Critical Level
theory violates the Mere Addition principle and entails the Sadistic Conclusion
gets intuitively worse, the higher the critical level is. Advocates of Critical Level
view therefore face a dilemma: If the critical level is too low then the view entails
a worryingly close analogue of the Repugnant Conclusion, but if the critical level
is too high then the view instead both entails a particularly worrying version
of the Sadistic Conclusion ((Broome, 2004, pp.213-4); (Arrhenius, n.d., section
5.1)), and violates the Mere Addition principle in a particularly egregious way.
(See also (Vallentyne, 2009; Broome, 2009).)
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Figure 6: How a Critical Level theory entails the Sadistic Conclusion: with the
critical level α as drawn, and with the right-hand subpopulation in A sufficiently
large, according to Critical Level theory A is worse than B.
5 Person-affecting views
5.1 Neutrality
Totalism holds that adding an extra person with positive well-being makes a
state of affairs better, other things being equal. This is arguably quite intuitive,
for reasons similar to those behind the Mere Addition Principle: lives worth
living are good things, and, one might think, more of a good thing is in general
better (and not merely, as the Mere Addition Principle conservatively holds, not
worse). Many people’s intuitions, however, strenuously resist this suggestion.
The worry is that if a mere addition makes a state of affairs better, it presumably
follows that we have at least some moral reason to create extra people, provided
that those extra people would have lives worth living. This implication is fairly
weak: the moral reason that we have may be one that is easily overridden
by other reasons of moral or non-moral type (in particular, there are several
reasons why it need not follow that we have obligations to have extra children,
not least that maximising consequentialism may not be the right account of the
connection between axiology and moral obligations). However, to many people,
even this weak implication is unacceptable: these people think that there are no
moral reasons, stemming from the well-being that the additional persons would
enjoy if created, to create additional persons. Thus, for example, Narveson
writes ‘We are in favour of making people happy, but neutral about making
happy people’ (1973, p.80).
These thoughts are captured in the following
Neutrality Principle: Adding an extra person to the world, if it is done in
such a way as to leave the well-being levels of others unaffected, does not
make a state of affairs either better or worse.8
8A weaker version of this principle would assert ‘neutrality’ only in cases in which the
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Note that none of the ‘impersonal’ population axiologies surveyed in sections
2–4 in general respects the Neutrality Principle. (Totalism and Averagism, for
instance, hold that adding an extra person is neutral only in the special case
in which that extra person has (respectively) zero well-being, or a well-being
level that is equal to the pre-existing average.) This suggests the project of
formulating a new ‘person-affecting’ population axiology that will recover the
Neutrality Principle. As we will now illustrate, however, it turns out to be
remarkably difficult to formulate any remotely acceptable axiology that captures
this idea of ‘neutrality’.9
5.2 The ‘Principle of equal existence’
If adding an extra person makes a state of affairs neither better nor worse,
perhaps it results in a state of affairs that is equally as good as the original state
of affairs. That is, one might try to capture the intuition of neutrality via the
following principle:
The Principle of Equal Existence: Let A be any state of affairs. Let B be
a state of affairs that is just like A, except that an additional person exists
who does not exist in A. (In particular, all the people who exist in A also
exist in B, and have the same well-being level in B as in A.) Then A and
B are equally good.
As Broome (1994, 2004, pp.146-9) points out, however, this principle is all but
self-contradictory. This is because there is more than one way of adding an
extra person to A — one might add an extra person with well-being level 5,
say (leading to state of affairs B1), or (instead) add the same extra person with
well-being level 100 (leading to state of affairs B2) — and these ways are not all
equally as good as one another. In our example, B2 is clearly better than B1; but
the Principle of Equal Existence would require that B1 and A are equally good,
and that A and B2 are equally good, in which case (by transitivity of ‘equally
as good as’) B1 and B2 would have to be equally as good as one another. The
Principle of Equal Existence therefore cannot be correct.
5.3 Non-impartial theories
A second type of attempt to capture the neutrality/person-affecting intuition
is explored in detail by Arrhenius (Arrhenius, n.d., chapter 10). According to
these ‘non-impartial’ theories, when comparing two states of affairs A and B in
terms of overall goodness, some of the possible persons who exist in A and/or
added person has zero or positive well-being: even those otherwise attracted to the idea of
neutrality may well feel that adding a person with a life that is strictly below the threshold
for being ‘worth living’ — a life of uncompensated pain and suffering, say — makes a state of
affairs worse. (This difference between positive and negative well-being is often termed ‘The
Asymmetry’.)
9The issues covered in this section are discussed at greater length by Broome (2004, chapter
10).
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in B matter — that is, their well-being is relevant to assessing the goodness of
A and B — whereas other such possible persons do not, in this sense, matter.
Within this broad framework, non-impartial theories can be further charac-
terised according to how they identify the privileged subset of possible persons.
Presentism holds that the only persons who matter are persons who presently
exist (and, in particular, not those who might or will exist in the future). Actual-
ism holds that the only persons who matter are actual persons (and not merely
possible persons) Necessitarianism holds that the only persons who matter, in a
situation of deciding between A and B, are those who exist both A and in B (i.e.,
those who, for the purposes of the present decision situation, exist ‘necessarily’
— who exist regardless of how the decision is settled — and not those whose
very existence is contingent on one’s current decision).10
Any of these theories, if otherwise satisfactory, would easily be able to cap-
ture the intuition that one has no moral reason to create an additional child,
via the Neutrality Principle. The hypothetical child does not, at the time of
deciding whether or not to create her, presently exist; provided one in fact
decides not to create her, she does not actually exist, even in the future; her
existence depends on one’s decision, so she is not, in the decision context under
consideration, a necessary person.
Such theories, however, are on further reflection deeply implausible. A pre-
liminary observation is that it is unclear whether Presentism or Actualism (at
any rate) would even help to avoid the problems that we have observed above for
‘impersonal’ theories. One can, for example, formulate versions of the Repug-
nant and Sadistic Conclusions using only present persons, or using only actual
persons.
In addition, the failure of these theories to consider the well-being of certain
possible persons leads to further trouble. Schematically, each theory postulates
an ‘in-group’ (whose interests are taken to matter) and an ‘out-group’ (whose
interests the theory ignores); we can then formulate cases in which each such
theory entails wildly implausible implications, in cases in which there is a lot
at stake for the ‘out-group’. In the examples that follow, for definiteness, we
will assume that each of the theories under consideration takes the value of a
state of affairs to be equal to the total well-being of the relevant ‘in-group’ (as
opposed to the priority-weighted total, or the value function of any other fixed-
population axiology), but similar problems would arise on other versions of a
presentist/actualist/necessitarian theory.
Presentism, for example, has obviously unacceptable implications for the
10Although presentist remarks are sometimes made in relatively careless context, this par-
ticular form of non-impartial theory appears to have few, if any, serious defenders. (For
example, (Heyd, 1988, pp.158, 161) makes some presentist-sounding remarks, but elsewhere
in the same article ostensibly the same ideas take on a more necessitarian form.) Necessitar-
ianism is discussed with sympathy, though not strongly advocated, by Singer (Singer, 2011,
pp.88–90) (who calls it “the prior existence view”); it is explicitly advocated by Heyd (1992,
p. 99). Actualism is perhaps the most popular approach in the ‘non-impartial’ space (see, in
particular, (Parsons, 2002; Cohen, n.d.); it is criticised by Hare (2007). For a more detailed
survey of all three types of theory, including further references, see (Arrhenius, n.d., chapter
10).
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following ‘future bliss or hell’ case:
Figure 7: ‘Future bliss or hell.’
Here, A and B are equal-sized populations; everyone in A has a blissful life,
while everyone in B has a hellish life; but all the people both in A and in B
are future people. Since presentism accords no importance to the well-being of
future persons, that theory implies that A and B are equally good. But that is
obviously absurd: clearly, A is better than B.
Actualism has similar implications for a variant of the ‘future bliss or hell’
case in which the intuitively worse state of affairs is one in which people have
lives that are worth living, but much less good than the lives in the intuitively
better state of affairs — call this the ‘future bliss or mediocrity’ case:
Figure 8: ‘Future bliss or mediocrity.’
Suppose, similarly to the ‘future bliss or hell’ case, that the populations in A
and B are disjoint. In this scenario, if A is actual then the actualist theory will
hold (correctly) that A is better than B. But if B is actual, the theory will hold,
implausibly, that B is better than A. This is unacceptable: an adequate theory
must capture the invariant fact that A is better than B.
To see the problems with necessitarianism, consider the three-option decision
scenario in figure 9. Here, person x exists in all three possible outcomes (A, B
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and C), while person y exists only in A and B:
Figure 9: A problem for necessitarianism.
Relative to this decision situation, a necessitarian theory will hold that A is
better than B: since y does not exist in C, a necessitarian theory holds that y’s
well-being is of no moral importance, so that the three options in this decision
situation are simply ordered according to the well-being of the single ‘necessary
person’, x. But this is implausible: at least for some variant of this scenario,
any plausible theory will hold that A is better than B (and necessitarianism
itself would agree if A and B were the only two options).
In addition to the problems we have just surveyed — problems arising from
the fact that each of these theories ignores the possible interests of some pos-
sible persons — actualism and necessitarianism also have structural problems,
already visible in the example cases we have considered. Actualism violates a
condition of axiological invariance: that the betterness relations between two
alternatives should not depend on which alternative is actual (for discussion of
this and/or of the related condition of normative invariance, see (Carlson, 1995,
pp.100-101), (Broome, 2004, p. 74), (Bykvist, 2007), (Howard-Snyder, 2008)).
And necessitarianism is choice-set-dependent: whether or not A is better than B
can depend, according to necessitarianism, on which other alternatives are also
contained in the choice set (in the above case: whether or not C is included).
Each of these structural features is arguably deeply problematic.
5.4 Harm-minimisation theories
A third type of person-affecting theory focusses on the minimisation of compar-
ative harm. The basic idea is as follows. Consider any state of affairs Ai, and
any person x who exists in Ai. Relative to choice set {A1, . . . , An}, say that
the amount of (comparative) harm that person x occurs in state of affairs Ai is
the amount by which x’s well-being in Ai falls short of the maximum well-being
level that x might have attained:
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CH (x,Ai) =
{
maxj (wj (x)− wi (x)) if this is positive
0 otherwise,
where wj(x) is x’s well-being level in state of affairs Aj . According to the harm-
minimisation theory, the best state of affairs is then the one in which there is
the lowest total comparative harm, summed over all persons who exist in the
state of affairs in question:
V (Ai) =
∑
{x:x exists in Ai} CH (x,Ai).
Theories along these lines are discussed by Roberts (2003, 2011), Meacham
(2012), Temkin (2012) and Ross (2015).
This type of theory equally succeeds in capturing neutrality as stated above.
To see this, note that if we are comparing (only) two states of affairs A1, A2
that are identical except that A2 contains an additional person (with positive
well-being level) who does not exist in A1, then (i) no other person suffers any
comparative harm in either state of affairs, since other persons’ well-being levels
are the same in A1 as they are in A2. In addition, (ii) the ‘added’ person suffers
no relevant comparative harm in A1 since she does not exist in A1, and suffers
no comparative harm in A2 since she has (if anything) a higher well-being level
in A2 than in A1.
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Harm-minimisation theories are subject, at least prima facie, to three prob-
lems. Firstly, like necessitarianism, they are choice-set-dependent: the relative
ranking of two states of affairs A1, A2 can be altered by the addition or removal
of some third alternative from/to the choice set, provided that A1 and A2 have
non-identical populations. (In the example in the previous paragraph, if a third
state of affairs A3 is added to the choice set, such that the ‘added’ person has
higher well-being in A3 than in A2, then relative to the choice set {A1, A2, A3}
the theory judges A2 worse than A1.) Secondly, and relatedly, the particular
way in which they are choice-set-dependent leads to what Ross (2015, section
4) calls the ‘problem of improvable life avoidance’: it is arguably implausible
that we have reasons to avoid bringing additional persons into existence with
a given, perhaps very high, well-being level rather than not bringing them into
existence at all, simply on the grounds that they could have been brought into
existence with an even higher well-being level. Thirdly, and most seriously, the
theory as stated above yields implausible verdicts in non-identity cases: given
any two states of affairs involving disjoint populations (or disjoint subpopula-
tions added to an unaffected pre-existing population), this theory will rank the
states of affairs in question as equally good.
11The verdicts of the comparative-harm theory in cases in which the added person has a
negative well-being level depend on whether or not, for this particular purpose, non-existence
is treated as akin to having a zero level of well-being. If it is so treated, then a person who
exists with negative well-being in state of affairs A suffers a positive amount of comparative
harm in A if there is an alternative state of affairs in which she does not exist. Comparative-
harm theorists who wish to capture ‘the procreative asymmetry’ in their axiology take this
route. Alternatively, a comparative-harm theorist might uphold neutrality for cases of adding
people with negative well-being, as well as for cases of adding people with positive well-being.
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The theory developed in (Meacham, 2012) avoids this third problem, via
careful specification of the relevant counterpart relations relating persons in dif-
ferent states of affairs. Others (e.g. (L. S. Temkin, 2012, section 12.3) , (Ross,
2015, p.438)) propose that a principle of harm-minimisation forms only part
of the correct overall axiology, and that the problem of disjoint populations
is to be dealt with by some other part of the overall theory. This latter pro-
posal, however, raises the question of what (if anything) is gained by adding a
harm-minimisation element to the ‘other part of theory’ to which it is coupled:
the hybrid theory, for example, may well fail to recover neutrality. However,
these matters as this are impossible to assess in abstraction from a detailed
specification of the full theory.
5.5 Theories with widespread incomparability
Elsewhere, Narveson comments that ‘morality has to do with how we treat
whatever people there are’; whether one prefers there to be more or fewer people,
he says, is ‘a matter of taste’ (1973, pp.72-3). This idea is initially supposed
to apply to one very particular decision context, viz. that of adding an extra
person to an otherwise fixed population. Generalising, however, a fairly natural
development of this idea is that relations of betterness and worseness hold only
in cases of fixed-population comparisons. That is, on this view, if A and B
have non-identical populations, then it is not the case that A is better than B,
nor is it the case that B is better than A, and nor is it the case that A and
B are equally good: A and B are, instead, incomparable in terms of overall
goodness. Note that, on the view in question, this incomparability holds not
only in cases of disjoint populations, but even if the populations in A and B are
almost identical: it only requires one person to exist in A but not in B, or vice
versa, for A and B to be deemed incomparable.
Views along these lines have been defended by David Heyd (1988) and by
Ralf Bader (n.d.). The obvious problem with such theories, however, is that in
at least some cases of differing populations, one of the states of affairs under
consideration is (intuitively) obviously better than the other. The ‘future bliss
or hell’ scenario discussed above is one case in point (a disjoint-population case),
but so also is a case in which adding an extra person would transform the lives
of all others from lives of bliss to lives of hell (a case of near-identical popu-
lations).12 Theories of widespread incomparability therefore appear to throw
out the baby with the bathwater; there may well be some incompleteness in
the betterness relation, perhaps especially in variable-population cases, but the
incompleteness cannot plausibly be as radical as this.
12On Bader’s theory, incomparability holds only when the populations in question fail to be
equinumerous — that is, when they fail to contain the same number of persons as one another
— and not simply when the populations are nonidentical. However, this disposes of only a
small fraction of the problematic cases, and does not address the fundamental problem: there is
still, on Bader’s theory, extremely widespread and consequently problematic incomparability.
For example, Bader’s theory has the same consequence as the more radical incomparability
theory for the case of near-identical populations discussed in the main text.
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6 Impossibility theorems
In his seminal discussion of population ethics, Parfit (1984) rejected Totalism
and Averagism for reasons including those given above, failed to find any alter-
native axiology that he himself considered satisfactory, but held out hope that
this was merely for want of searching hard enough: that, in the future, some
fully satisfactory population axiology, called ‘Theory X’ by way of placeholder,
might be found. Much of the subsequent literature has consisted of attempts
to formulate such a ‘Theory X’. However, as we have seen above, every extant
population axiology is open to serious objection: if it does not entail the Repug-
nant Conclusion then it entails the Sadistic Conclusion, or is anti-egalitarian,
or has obviously unacceptable implications concerning future-people cases, or
otherwise leads to some similarly serious objection.
If this were where matters rested, one might yet hold out hope that the fully
satisfactory ‘Theory X’ is lurking just around the corner. However, several au-
thors have also formulated impossibility theorems for population axiology. These
are formal results that purport to show, for various combinations of intuitively
compelling desiderata (‘avoid the Repugnant Conclusion’, ‘avoid the Sadistic
Conclusion’, ‘respect Non-Anti-Egalitarianism’, and so forth), that the desider-
ata are in fact mutually inconsistent: that is, simply as a matter of logic, no
population axiology can simultaneously satisfy all of those desiderata (Parfit,
1984; Y.-K. Ng, 1989; Carlson, 1998; Arrhenius, 2000; Kitcher, 2000; Arrhenius,
n.d.).13
In the light of this, some argue that the Repugnant Conclusion (in particular)
may not, at the end of the day, be so clearly unacceptable.14 According to this
line of thought, the Repugnant Conclusion certainly initially seems repugnant
— that is, it is repugnant to untutored intuition — but this ‘anti-repugnance’
intuition can be debunked as the product of one or more distorting biasses.
This line of thought is pressed, in particular, by Torbjo¨rn Ta¨nnsjo¨ (2002) and
Huemer (2008); see also (Broome, 2004; Pummer, 2013, pp.57-9). Others sug-
gest that one might escape from the impossibility theorems by denying the as-
sumptions that those theorems make concerning the structure of the well-being
scale, and/or by appealing to vagueness or incompleteness of the betterness re-
lation (Broome, 2004; Qizilbash, 2005; Rabinowicz, 2009; Parfit, 2016; Thomas,
n.d., pp.213-4). Still others argue that the normative force of the impossibil-
ity theorems depends on an assumption of choice-set-independence, and then
go on argue that the choice-set-dependence exhibited by e.g. necessitarianism
and comparative-harm theories may be positively a virtue of those theories, so
13Importantly (since not everyone’s reflective judgments deem this principle compelling),
not all of these theorems involve any very close cousin of the Mere Addition principle. For
example, while Arrhenius’ (n.d.) Second and Fifth theorems include a principle of Dominance
Addition that is very close to the Mere Addition principle, in his Third, Fourth and Sixth
theorems, Dominance Addition is replaced by an anti-Sadism condition.
14Denial of either the Repugnant Conclusion itself, or some close relative, is one of the
axioms of every extant impossibility theorem. Thus, accepting the Repugnant Conclusion
(and its close relatives) provides a way out of all impossibility theorems simultaneously. For
instance, Totalism does not violate any of the other axioms of any of these theorems.
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that we can hope to find an adequate theory in this space (see in particular
(Meacham, 2012, section 7); related ideas are pressed by Temkin (1987; 2012)).
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One common, but mistaken, response to the impossibility theorems is to
turn claim that these theorems are problematic only for consequentialists. It
is important to see that this is a mistake. For one thing, as noted above, all
moral theories need an axiology: while non-consequentialists might spend much
of their theorising time on the non-axiological part of their theory, the axiologi-
cal part too must be part of the full normative story at the end of the day. For
another, it can be shown (Arrhenius, n.d., chapter 12) that there are straight-
forward deontological analogues of the impossibility theorems (concerning the
relation ‘ought to choose rather than’ in place of ‘is better than’), so that even
a moral theory that has no place for axiology faces essentially the same set of
issues.
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